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I. INTRODUCTION
In the midst of these scholarly international law discussions, I
bring you a prosecutor's perspective of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (the Tribunal).
I am a former federal prosecutor from the Southern District of
New York, now on leave from my position as partner in a New York
law firm. Most of my colleagues in the Office of the Prosecutor are
prosecutors and criminal investigators. Very few of us came to the
Tribunal with any knowledge, let alone expertise, in matters of
international humanitarian law. We have come to learn that for most
of the legal issues we confront, there is scant authority and we must
therefore rely on theoretical arguments. Until the Appeals Chamber
of the Tribunal rules on the first few cases, the best we can do is to
formulate reasonable approaches to virtually every legal issue we
encounter, from fundamental challenges to our jurisdiction, to
applications of the command responsibility doctrine, to definitions of
the elements of the crimes within our jurisdiction and rules for
admissibility of evidence.
At the same time that we are debating these legal issues, we are
gathering evidence and deciding which cases to prosecute, and how.
To give you some insight into how we have been operating, there are
three points I think it is important to understand. The first point is
what it means, as a practical matter, to say that we are building a truly
international prosecutor's office; second, the criteria we have used to
decide which cases we will investigate and prosecute; and third, our
overarching concern for fairness and due process.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE TRIBUNAL
Alarmed by news of human rights abuses in the former Yugosla-
via, reported with increasing urgency by the world press and non-
governmental organizations in the summer of 1992, the United
Nations Security Council in October 1992 established a Commission
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of Experts to report on those abuses.' The Commission amassed
thousands of documents and interviewed many people, albeit not
necessarily collecting the information in a way that would create
admissible evidence in a court of law, and reported that indeed there
had been apparent serious violations of human rights.2
In May 1993, following a report from the Secretary-General, the
Security Council adopted a resolution establishing the Tribunal.3 The
resolution includes the Tribunal's statute (Tribunal Statute), which
defines our office's jurisdiction to prosecute particular crimes and sets
forth certain guiding principles.4 Pursuant to the Tribunal Statute,
there are four different crimes within our jurisdiction:
1. grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions;
2. violations of the laws and customs of war;
3. crimes against humanity; and
4. genocide.5
In September 1993, the General Assembly of the United Nations
appointed a panel of eleven judges, each from a different country, to
the Tribunal. The judges are more or less evenly balanced between
civil law and common law backgrounds. Most judges have experience
on the bench, while three are distinguished professors of international
law. Over the first year or so, the judges met in plenary session and
issued their Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Rules). 6 The Rules
offer much, but by no means complete, guidance as to how the
Tribunal will conduct trials and other proceedings. Coming from a
common law background, I view the Tribunal Statute and Rules as
essentially providing a common law approach. My colleagues from
civil law countries agree, but point out that there are also civil law
aspects. For example, pursuant to Article 19 of the Tribunal Statute
1. S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (1992).
2. Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992), Annex I, U.N. Doc. S/25274 (1993).
3. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
4. Statute of the International Tribunal, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc.
S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter Tribunal Statute].
5. Id. arts. 2-5.
6. International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since
1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32 (March 14, 1994), adopted Feb. 11,
1994, entered into force March 14, 1994, reprinted in 33 1.L.M. 484 (1994) [hereinafter Tribunal
Rules].
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and Rule 47, indictments must be presented to one of the judges for
confirmation, together with some or all of the supporting evidence.7
This is a procedure that is familiar to those from civil law jurisdictions.
Simultaneous to the work of the judges, Theo Van Boven, a
distinguished international law professor, was appointed as acting
registrar to oversee the administrative functions of the Tribunal. A
jail was prepared and staffed, ready and waiting for the day when
prisoners would be brought to the Hague. However, it was not until
the end of July 1994, more than a year after the Security Council
resolution was adopted, that the Prosecutor, South Africa's Judge
Richard Goldstone, was appointed. Several months earlier, the
Secretary-General had appointed as Acting Deputy Prosecutor
Graham Blewitt, who, at first almost single handedly, undertook to
organize the Prosecutor's office, to recruit staff, and, on an interim
and inadequate budget, to get the office up and running. When Judge
Goldstone arrived at the end of August 1994, he found about forty
staff members who had just begun to work. By October 1995, the
Office of the Prosecutor had increased its size to about 130 people,
including lawyers, investigators, analysts and secretaries. In addition,
there are about fifteen interpreters. About thirty of our number have
been lent by the United States, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway
and Great Britain.
In November 1994, the Security Council established a war crimes
tribunal for Rwanda that is parallel, in many ways, to the Yugoslav
Tribunal.' Judge Goldstone is also the Prosecutor for the Rwanda
Tribunal, and the same judges who comprise the Appeals Chamber of
the Yugoslav Tribunal serve as the Appeals Chamber for the Rwanda
Tribunal. Although the circumstances in Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia are very different, the hope is to achieve a consistency in
general approach.
III. A TRULY INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
While we in the Office of the Prosecutor for the former Yugoslav
Tribunal were still learning to work together, the public and the judges
were understandably impatient for us to bring cases. One of my
colleagues described the manner in which the Tribunal was organized,
with the judges appointed more than a year before the Prosecutor, as
like trying to build a house from the roof down. This criticism, I
7. Tribunal Statute, supra note 4, art. 19; Tribunal Rules, supra note 6, rule 47.
8. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
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suppose, is understandable. However, one must keep in mind the
numerous obstacles this office has faced. There was no precedent at
the United Nations for establishing and running a prosecutor's office,
and no understanding of the resources required or the time it takes to
investigate criminal cases and prepare them for trial. The first interim
budgets neglected to provide for interpreters and a host of other
things most prosecutor's offices take for granted.'
We are trying not only to create an operating prosecutor's office
where there was none before, but also to create a truly international
office, with lawyers and investigators who come from many different
countries and legal systems working together on the same projects.
Every day we experience a practical application of comparative
criminal procedure. We are not, as was the case at Nuremberg,
separate national teams of well-organized military lawyers and
investigators with shared assumptions about legal, evidentiary and
procedural matters.
When we started, we had no operating procedures or conceptual
framework in place. With one significant exception," we have no
shared assumptions about legal, evidentiary or procedural matters.
For us, all the things prosecutors and investigators ordinarily do must
be articulated, discussed and understood. For example, concrete
operating questions like what a witness statement should look like,
long, short, almost verbatim, question and answer format, taped,
sworn; how many factual allegations should be contained in an
indictment; whether an accused's "actual knowledge" should be
determined according to an objective or subjective standard; whether
signed witness statements should be treated as exhibits; what records
and practices are necessary to prove chain of custody of exhibits; were
all subjects of debate. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence do not
provide enough detail to offer guidance in that level of detail. Most
of us are happy to set aside hypertechnical requirements from our own
jurisdictions and create something more sensible, but even so, there
are always questions.
A conversation I had with two colleagues, both very experienced
prosecutors and both from common law countries, when we were just
beginning to work in July 1994, illustrates the dramatic differences in
9. Several countries and organizations have been generous in providing support to the
Tribunal, but we still do not have an adequate number of interpreters, a library, or enough filing
cabinets, chairs and file folders.
10. See infra part V.
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legal viewpoints that we continuously confront. A conversation about
taking witness statements turned to preparing witnesses for cross
examination. I described the procedure I used in New York, which
was to ask the witness the difficult questions expected from the
adversary. One of my colleagues, who comes from a jurisdiction
where the witnesses are considered to be neutral and to "belong" to
the state, said that if he followed such a procedure, he would be
subject to criminal prosecution. Another colleague, from another
jurisdiction, said that where he comes from, it would not be criminal,
but it would be unethical. I said that for me to fail to prepare the
witness in this way would be malpractice.
Then how do we decide what to do? In a context where there is
no particular authority and where no jurisdiction necessarily carries
more weight than any other, we have found no better way than to
consider each issue as it comes up, debate it, and try to find a sensible
consensus. We are aware that the decisions we make will become a
type of precedent for the future of this, and perhaps other, interna-
tional criminal tribunals. Although that thought may inspire still more
awe than we already have for our responsibility, the decisions we
reach are most often driven by what I hope is practical common sense
and an attempt to define and adhere to common core principles for
the administration of justice.
IV. CRITERIA FOR INVESTIGATING AND PROSECUTING
Our decisions as to what cases to pursue have been guided
primarily by the same kind of practical considerations. The war in the
former Yugoslavia is still going on. We do not have captured
documents or imprisoned senior officials as sources of evidence. We
do not yet have intelligence reports from United Nations Member
States. We are just starting to receive actual witness statements and
other evidence collected by some non-governmental organizations.
We do have journalists' published articles and summary reports from
non-governmental organizations and materials collected by the
Commission of Experts. These are very useful as leads but, because
they are not necessarily based on first hand observation and are often
impossible to corroborate, they are not themselves evidence upon
which we can build a criminal case.
As we began to work, it was apparent that we could not start, as
they did at Nuremberg and Tokyo, with cases against the military and
political leaders. We had to have a way to find out, as precisely as
possible, what had actually happened. The obvious first step was to
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begin talking with witnesses.
We began by following up on one of the case studies undertaken
by the Commission of Experts. It was an examination of events in the
area of Prijedor in northwestern Bosnia during the Serbian offensive
in the spring of 1992. At the same time, we started investigating what
appeared to be a systematic campaign of terror conducted by Serbian
authorities throughout Bosnia, a campaign apparently designed to
persuade non-Serb residents to leave their homes and never return.
We also probed reports of atrocities committed by Croats and
Muslims.
Long before the Office of the Prosecutor had any staff, German
authorities in Munich arrested a man named Dusko Tadic, who was
accused by Bosnian refugees there, and reported by a German
journalist, as being responsible for war crimes in the Prijedor area. In
the fall of 1994, mindful of the importance of our being able to
present evidence as soon as possible in a public trial (the Tribunal
Statute and Rules do not permit trials in absentia)," we asked the
Tribunal judges to request that the German prosecution defer to our
investigation. A provision in our Rules, based on the principle set
forth in Article 9 of the Tribunal Statute regarding the Tribunal's
primacy over national courts, permits us to seek such deferral.12 The
Tribunal judges granted our application, the deferral request was
made, and we filed an indictment against Mr. Tadic in February 1995.
After German enabling legislation was passed permitting deferral to
the Tribunal, Mr. Tadic arrived in The Hague in April 1995.
Mr. Tadic is not a senior official comparable to the members of
the German High Command who were the first persons tried at
Nuremberg. But to the victims of Mr. Tadic and his colleagues, to
those who suffered as a result of the actions of ordinary prison guards
and police officials, it is very important that some of their torturers be
brought to justice. Only by prosecuting particular individuals, at all
levels of responsibility, can we hope to persuade the victims that
justice has been done. We must persuade the victims that criminal
responsibility is personal to the particular person accused and should
not be attributed to entire communities. Only in this way, we believe,
11. Recently, the judges of the Tribunal revised Rule 61, permitting us to call witnesses to
testify publicly in the context of a proceeding to reconfirm an indictment and issue an in
temational arrest warrant in the event the arrest warrant issued by the Tribunal when the
indictment was first confirmed has not been honored. In that context, publicly but without an
adjudication of guilt or innocence, we will be able to demonstrate some of our findings.
12. Tribunal Rules, supra note 6, rule 10; Tribunal Statute, supra note 4, art. 9(2).
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can the Tribunal be useful in helping to break the endless cycle of
violence and retribution. We can not possibly prosecute every prison
guard who caused great suffering in Yugoslavia, and our primary focus
is on the leaders who were responsible for instigating and directing the
crimes. At the same time, we think prosecutions of prison guards and
others like them have significant symbolic value and that it is our
obligation to pursue some of them.
As of July 1995, we had filed seven other indictments, including
one that charged Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic with
genocide and crimes against humanity. As a result of an investigation
involving serious human rights abuses at a detention camp in the
Vlasenica area, abuses that appear to be similar to those we are
finding in other places in Bosnia, in our first indictment issued in
November 1994, we charged a camp official, Dragan Nikolic, with
several violations of the Tribunal Statute. In February 1995, we filed
an indictment arising from the Prijedor investigation against the camp
commander and several others responsible for crimes at the Omarska
detention camp, where countless civilians from Prijedor were killed,
raped, tortured, beaten, and otherwise abused. We charged the camp
commander with genocide and he and the others were also accused of
other violations of the Tribunal Statute. That indictment is particular-
ly significant, we think, because Omarska is the first camp in Bosnia
that international journalists were permitted to see and film, in August
1992. It is largely as a result of their work that the international
community began to address the apparent human rights abuses
occurring in the former Yugoslavia.
Since April 1992, hundreds of thousands of non-Serbs have left
their homes in Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia. Our investigation so
far indicates that most of these people left, or were killed, as a result
of a deliberate campaign of terror, a phenomenon that has come to be
known as ethnic cleansing. Based on the pattern of abuses that we
have found at Omarska, Vlasenica, and several other places like them
in other parts of Bosnia, we are building cases against those Serbs in
positions of authority who organized, ordered, or were otherwise
responsible for the abuses. At the same time, our investigations of
abuses by various Croats and Muslims are continuing.
There are those who say that the atrocities committed during the
course of this war are simply the consequences of deep-seated hatreds
and demands for vengeance, whether decades or centuries old. One
danger in this viewpoint is that it suggests that the atrocities and
human rights abuses are something peculiar to the Balkans, so that the
19951
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abuses need not be taken quite so seriously. In our view, that
approach is also factually incorrect. However deep-seated and ancient
the group tensions may be, it is apparent to us that they were
deliberately inflamed. We intend to prosecute the persons responsible
for deliberately inciting others to commit war crimes.
V. FAIRNESS AND DUE PROCESS
There is one central point on which all of us at the Office of the
Prosecutor, no matter what country or legal system we come from,
agree, and for which we needed no debate: our determination that the
prosecutions be, and be perceived to be, fair. As professionals, that
is an article of faith for us.
There are those, not in the Office of the Prosecutor, who suggest
that we simply rely on hearsay, journalists' reports, or file charges and
investigate later, or that because a particular person was in a position
of authority, we should simply assume that he must have been
responsible for the atrocities. Our view is that as prosecutors of
human rights violations, we must be exemplary in our respect for the
rights of the accused. If the Tribunal is necessary, as we think it is, to
bring a sense of justice to the victims, and thereby undercut a hopeless
cycle of revenge, than it is imperative that everything the Tribunal
does be fair to the accused and conducted according to the highest
standards of due process. We must also strive to ensure that our
proceedings are perceived as fair, especially in the former Yugoslavia.
We must be an example to the states that we expect in time will
prosecute the cases we can not possibly handle.
When I was first trained as a prosecutor in the Southern District
of New York, in the office of Robert Fiske, I became aware of the
enormous power prosecutors have to affect people's lives, victims as
well as those accused, simply through the power to indict. Prosecutors
must have broad discretion and independence from political demands
to exercise that discretion wisely and fairly. My colleagues share a
common appreciation of the power to prosecute and the responsibility
that accompanies that power.
VI. CONCLUSION
In law school, I was fortunate to have taken two constitutional
law courses taught by Telford Taylor. He was inspiring, although he
never said a word about Nuremberg. What he taught me, by the
example of his analysis, is a cornerstone of how I approach our work
as prosecutors: the need for care and accuracy and thorough
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understanding. I, and my colleagues, no matter where they come
from, are trying to achieve the standard he set.
We hope that by convicting those most responsible for the
atrocities in the former Yugoslavia we will help to demonstrate that
justice is possible. We hope our work will help to restore the rule of
law in that part of the world, and at the same time confirm the
fundamental underpinnings for international humanitarian law that
will serve us all well into the next century.

